Abstract. Von Neumann and others considered a two-person zero-sum game with nonlinear payoff function x T Ay I xTBy, where A and B are m X n matrices, xT is the row m-vector strategy of the maximizing player (player I), andy is the column n-vector strategy of the minimizing player (player 2). This game is defined to be completely mixed if every solution (or optimal strategy) (x, y) is such that all elements of x and all elements of y are positive. In such a game, it is supposed that the matrices A and B are infinitesimally perturbed by matrices of perturbations, i.e., multiple elements of each matrix are perturbed simultaneously. The effect of such perturbations on the solution and value of the game is calculated.
1. Introduction. This paper develops the perturbation theory of a finite, two-person, zero-sum game with a nonlinear payoff function proposed by von Neumann [ 13] in a model of economic growth. Subsequent development of the model has been synthesized by Morgenstern and Thompson [ 11] . The same payoff function appears in a special case of a stochastic game proposed by Shapley [ 12] . Because the game has more than economic interpretations, we shall not emphasize the economic view of the game nor restrict our assumptions to those that might be plausible in an economic application. Von Neumann's game has m pure strategies for player 1, the maximizing player, and n pure strategies for player 2, the minimizing player, where 1 ~ m, n < oo. The strategy of player 1 is specified by a row m-vector xT, where X; is the probability that player 1 chooses pure strategy i, for i = 1, · · · , m. The strategy of player 2 is specified by a column n-vector y, where yj is the probability that player 2 chooses pure strategy j, for j =; 1, · · · , n. The payoff function of the game, that is, the amount of money player 2 must pay player 1 if player 1 has strategy x T and player 2 has strategy y, is x T Ay I x T By, where A and B are real m X n matrices. This payoff function is defined (though possibly equal to +oo) provided its numerator and denominator are not simultaneously equal to zero; additional conditions will be provided to assure that the payoff function is always defined. As there does not appear to be a standard name for this game, we shall call it a rational game specified by (A, B) , because the payoff function is a ratio of linear forms.
Marchi [ 8] extended and generalized the equilibrium points of a rational game to an n-person game with a rational payoff function. Marchi [7] and Marchi, Tarazaga, and Elorza [ 9] applied such results to expanding economies.
The perturbation theory of a game describes how small variations in the parameters of the payoff function affect the solution and value of the game. The perturbation theory of games in general, and of rational games in particular, is of practical interest for both estimation and control. The value of a rational game has an economic interpretation as the asymptotic rate of change (growth or decrease) of an economy. In economic applications of the game, the matrices A (the output matrix) and B (the input matrix) must be estimated from data. The first derivative of the value with respect to the elements of A and B indicates the value's sensitivity to errors in the values of these elements, and therefore indicates which elements should be measured with greatest precision. Kuhn and Tucker [ 6, p. viii] recognized the importance of perturbation theory for control in their introduction to the work of Mills [ lO] : "This study promises practical application whenever these parameters [the matrix elements] can be controlled or altered since it indicates which changes will have a beneficial effect on the value."
To our knowledge, the perturbation theory of rational games has not been studied before, except in the linear special case when B = lm,n• where lm,n is them X n matrix with every element equal to one. In this case, a rational game reduces to an ordinary two-person zero-sum matrix game. Previous studies of the perturbation theory of zerosum matrix games are reviewed by Cohen [ 1] and Cohen, Marchi, and Oviedo [ 3] . We now establish notation and state some results which are mostly standard or readily proved. To prove the existence of a solution to the matricial problem, we recall a result of Marchi [ 8] which is a special case of a theorem of Karamardian [ 5 ] . LEMMA The theorem is easily proved by using the lemma. Essentially this theorem was known to von Neumann [ 13] . Under the conditions given by von Neumann [ 13] While xTB is unique, under the assumptions of Proposition 1, it is clear that xT need not be unique. 
is analytic in a. Define a rational game specified by (A, B) to be nonsingular if A and B are both n X n and both nonsingular.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose a nonsingular rational game specified by (A, B) is em, B > 0, and A -I B > 0. Then there exists a real number r such that if I a I < r, the rational game specified by (L(a), M(a)) is nonsingular and em, the value v(a) of that game is  given by v(a) = 1/p([L(a)r  1 M(a)), and the solution (x(a), y(a) ) ofthat game is unique.
In other words, for sufficiently small perturbations (measured by a), under the common assumptions of Propositions 1 and 2, the conclusions of Proposition 1 about the unperturbed rational game specified by (A, B) carry over to the perturbed rational game specified by (L(a), M(a)).
Proof If A and Bare nonsingular, then so are sufficiently small perturbations of A and B. Thus, the rational game specified by ( L( a), M( a) ) is nonsingular for small enough values of a. By Proposition 1, the game specified by (A, B) has solutions (x, y) such that y and zT = xTB are unique. Because B-1 exists, zTB-1 = xT is also unique.
As Proof The existence of the derivative follows from Proposition 2 and preceding remarks. Now use the chain rule. If(x(a), y(a)) and v(a) are the solution and value ofthe nonsingular em rational game specified by (L(a), M(a)), then ( a)y( a) ). It is not difficult to verify that when B = ln,n and H = 0, the preceding formulas reduce to those found for ordinary zero-sum matrix games by Mills [ l 0] and Cohen [ l] . A task for the future is to derive perturbation results similar to the preceding under weaker or different conditions from those assumed in Theorem 2.
